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Abstract Trees with indistinguishability relations provide a semantics for a tempo-
ral language “composed by” the Peircean tense operators and the Ockhamist modal
operator. In this paper, a finite axiomatization with a non standard rule for this lan-
guage interpreted over bundled trees with indistinguishability relations is given. This
axiomatization is proved to be sound and strongly complete.
Keywords Branching-time · Finite axiomatization · Strong completeness ·
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1 Introduction
Branching-time logics have traditionally played a major role in modelling non-
deterministic theories about time. Since [12], two main semantics for logics of
branching-time have been considered. Prior called Peircean and Ockhamist these
semantics. The essential difference between them is the interpretation of the future
operator F in a tree-like representation of time.
In Peircean semantics, Fϕ is read as “eventually in the future, on every history
passing through the moment under consideration, ϕ will happen”. Peircean language
has also a future operator G, whose interpretation is “always in the future, on every
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history passing through the moment under consideration”. The Ockhamist interpre-
tation of Fϕ, instead, is relative to pairs (moment, history), and Fϕ is read as
“eventually in the future, on the history under consideration, ϕ will happen”. The
Ockhamist language counterpart of the branching aspect of time is a modal oper-
ator L that quantifies over the set of histories passing through the moment under
consideration.
Various works on logics of agency consider a partition of this set into undivid-
edness classes, e.g. [3]: two histories are undivided at t whenever their intersection
contains a moment in the future of t .
In [22], a generalization of the notion of undividedness is considered: at any
moment t , an equivalence relation It (indistinguishability at t) between the histories
passing through t is given. The only property of the indistinguishability relations is
that, if two histories are indistinguishable at a moment t , they are also indistinguish-
able at every moment in the past of t (indistinguishability condition). This implies,
in particular, that undividedness is a particular case of indistinguishability.
Trees with indistinguishability relations (I -trees) provide a semantics for a tempo-
ral language with tense and modal operators [22]. In this semantics, truth is relative
to pairs (t, π), where t is a moment and π is an indistinguishability class at t , and
the modal operator quantifies over indistinguishability classes. The tense operators
have a Peircean reading, but the implicit quantification over histories is restricted to
the indistinguishability class under consideration.
As it is pointed out in [22], Ockhamist and Peircean semantics correspond to the
limit cases of the I -tree semantics in which each (respectively, no) history passing
through t is distinguishable at t from any other.
In this paper, a finite axiomatization with a non standard rule for such a lan-
guage interpreted over bundled I -trees with indistinguishability relations is given.
This axiomatization is proved to be sound and strongly complete.
The syntax and the semantics are presented in Section 2. The language considered
has, as tense operators, F andG for the future andH for the past, and, as modal oper-
ator,L. F ,G and L are interpreted as explained above.H is interpreted as “always in
the past, on every history passing through the class under consideration”. The seman-
tics is given with respect to the class of bundled I -trees, instead of with respect to
trees. A bundle on a tree is a selection of the histories of the tree such that every
moment occurs in at least one history of the bundle. Moreover, trees are required to
be upward endless. The indistinguishability relations and the quantification of the
tense operators are restricted to the histories selected by the bundle.
There are two main reasons why we consider bundled I -trees instead of I -trees.
A technical one: the Soundness and Strong Completeness Theorem is achieved by a
particular construction in which only histories of a particular kind are desired and the
bundle let us select these histories (cf. Section 4 Question 2). And a conceptual one: it
has been argued, e.g. in [10, 11], that bundled validity is a more correct formalization
of human intuition about time and possibility (nonetheless, we cannot avoid to report
that, e.g. in [14], doubts about preferring bundled validity have been raised).
In Section 2, the Hilbert system is also presented. This Hilbert system is a “mix”
of the Hilbert system for Peircean semantics presented in [2] and the Hilbert system
for Ockhamist semantics presented in [7, Section 7.7, pp. 299–306].
Axiomatization of a Branching Time Logic...
Among the deduction rules of the system, a form of the IRR rule occurs. IRR
rules have been introduced in [6], where it is shown that they can characterize
irreflexivity, a property that, as it is well known, cannot be characterized by modal
axioms.
A version of this rule is employed here because it yields important properties
of the structure built to prove the Soundness and Strong Completeness Theorem
(cf. Section 3.2, in particular Remark 15).
The completeness theorem is achieved in Section 3 by a construction adapted
from [2], mostly for what concerns the Peircean aspects of the logic, and from
[7, Section 7.7, pp. 299–306], mostly for what concerns the Ockhamist aspects of the
logic.
1.1 Historical Background
As mentioned, Peircean and Ockhamist semantics have been introduced in [12].
Peircean logic has been axiomatized in [2] with a form of the IRR rule and in [20]
without. The bundled version of Ockhamist logic has been axiomatized in [19] with-
out IRR rule (an axiomatization with a form of the IRR rule due to Gabbay is cited
in [18]). An axiomatization of the unbundled Ockhamist logic and a brief sketch of
the completeness proof have been presented in [15].
Many other logics of branching time have been introduced. All of them are some
kind of variation of either Peircean or Ockhamist logic. E.g., in [19] and [20], the
temporal operators G and H are replaced by the more expressive ‘Since’ and ‘Until’
operators from [8]. Branching time logics are often used in computer science. Here,
since time simulates the steps of a computation, time is assumed discrete. Example
of such logics are the Peircean logics UB of [1], CTL of [4], the Ockhamist version
CTL* of [5] and the P -extension of CTL*, PCTL*, of [9, 21]. Also many of these
logics have been axiomatized. E.g., bundled CTL* in [17], CTL* in [13] and PCTL*
in [16].
As for the notion of ‘indistinguishability’, the semantics with ‘indistinguishabil-
ity’ relations has been defined in [22] as a generalization of the semantics with
‘undividedness’ relations of [3].
2 Syntax, Semantics and Hilbert system
In this section the syntax, the semantics and the Hilbert system are given.
2.1 Syntax
Here, the language and what a formula is are defined.
Definition 1 Let PV be a countably infinite set. The elements of PV are called
atoms. The set L = PV ∪ {(, ),¬,∧, G, F,H,L} is called language. Formulas are
strings of language elements built up recursively according to the following rules:
1. p ∈ PV is a formula.
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2. If ϕ and ψ are formulas, (¬ϕ), (ϕ ∧ ψ), (Gϕ), (Fϕ), (Hϕ) and (Lϕ) are
formulas.
∨, → and ↔ are the usual abbreviations. P abbreviates ¬H¬, f abbreviates ¬G¬,
g abbreviates ¬F¬, and M abbreviates ¬L¬. The usual precedence rules among
operators are assumed. Call theory any set of formulas.
2.2 Semantics
Here, a number of definitions are given in order to define the semantics. After them,
satisfiability and validity for a formula, and semantical entailment of a formula from
a theory are defined.
Definition 2 A binary relation R over a set A is called downward linear if, for each
a, b, c ∈ A such that bRa and cRa, b = c or bRc or cRb. A binary relation R over a
set A is called linear if, for each a, b ∈ A, a = b or aRb or bRa. A binary relation R
over a set A is called upward endless if, for each a ∈ A, there is b ∈ A such that aRb.
Definition 3 A tree is a 2-tuple (T ,<), where T is a set and < is an irreflexive,
transitive and downward linear binary relation on T .
Definition 4 Given a tree T = (T ,<), we call history any ⊆-maximal <-linear
h ⊆ T . HT denotes the set of histories in T . Given t ∈ T , HT ,t denotes the set of
histories h in T passing through t , that is with t ∈ h.
Remark 5 Given a tree T = (T ,<), and a non empty linear subset S ⊆ T , by Zorn’s
Lemma, it is possible to extend S to a history.
Definition 6 Given a tree T = (T ,<), a subset B ⊆ HT is called bundle if it
fulfils T = ⋃h∈B h. Given a tree (T ,<) and a bundle B , the 3-tuple (T ,<, B) is
called bundled tree. Given a bundled tree (T ,<, B) and t ∈ T , Bt denotes the set of
histories h ∈ B passing through t .
Definition 7 Given a bundled tree (T ,<, B), a function I : T → P(B×B), t 	→ It ,
is called indistinguishability function if it fulfils the following condition:
1. It is an equivalence relation over Bt .
2. For every h, k ∈ B and every t, s ∈ h ∩ k, with t < s, if hIsk then hIt k.
Given a bundled tree (T ,<, B) and an indistinguishability function I : T →
P(B × B), the 4-tuple (T ,<, B, I ) is called bundled I -tree. Given a bundled I -
tree T = (T ,<, B, I ) and t ∈ T , T ,t denotes the set of the equivalence classes
of It .
The suffixes will be forgotten when there is no case of confusion.
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Definition 8 A 4-tuple F = (T ,<, B, I ) is called frame if (T ,<, B, I ) is a bundled
I -tree and < is upward endless. A 5-tuple M = (T ,<, B, I, V ) is called model if
(T ,<, B, I ) is a frame for L and V : PV → P(⋃t∈T ({t} × T ,t )) is a function,
called evaluation.
Definition 9 Given any modelM = (T ,<, B, I, V ), any atom p, any two formulas
ϕ and ψ , define
1. M, (t, π) |= p if (t, π) ∈ V (p).
2. M, (t, π) |= ¬ϕ if M, (t, π) |= ϕ.
3. M, (t, π) |= ϕ ∧ ψ ifM, (t, π) |= ϕ and M, (t, π) |= ψ .
4. M, (t, π) |= Gϕ if, for each h ∈ π and each s ∈ h with t < s,M, (s, [h]Is ) |=
ϕ.
5. M, (t, π) |= Fϕ if, for each h ∈ π , there is s ∈ h with t < s such that
M, (s, [h]Is ) |= ϕ.
6. M, (t, π) |= Hϕ if, for each h ∈ π and each s ∈ h with s < t , M, (s, [h]Is ) |=
ϕ.
7. M, (t, π) |= Lϕ if, for each ρ ∈ t ,M, (t, ρ) |= ϕ.
If M, (t, π) |= ϕ, we say that M, (t, π) satisfies ϕ. If ϕ is satisfied at each (t, π)
in M, we say that M satisfies ϕ, written M |= ϕ. If ϕ is satisfied in every M, we
say that ϕ is valid, written |= ϕ. Finally, given a set of formulas  and a formula
ϕ, we say that  semantically entails ϕ, written  |= ϕ, if, for each model M =
(T ,<,B, I, h), each t ∈ T and each π ∈ t such thatM, (t, π) |= ψ for all ψ ∈ ,
M, (t, π) |= ϕ.
2.3 Hilbert System
Here, the Hilbert system is given, and provability for a formula and syntactical
entailment of a formula from a theory are defined.
The Hilbert system is a “mix” of the Hilbert system for Peircean semantics pre-
sented in [2] and the Hilbert system for Ockhamist semantics presented in [7, Section
7.7, pp. 299–306]. In particular, axioms 1b – 1n come from [2]. Axioms 1o – 1r are
S5 for L, exactly as in [7, Section 7.7, pp. 299–306], while axioms 1s and 1t are
adapted from [7, Section 7.7, pp. 299–306] to the present context. Among the deduc-
tion rules of the system, a form of the IRR rule occurs. A form of the IRR rule also
occurs in both [2] and [7, Section 7.7, pp. 299–306].
Definition 10 Here is the Hilbert system:
1. Axioms: let p, q be any two distinct atoms
(a) All propositional logic tautologies.
(b) H(p → q) → (Hp → Hq).
(c) G(p → q) → (Gp → Gq).
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(d) G(p → q) → (Fp → Fq).
(e) p → Hfp.
(f) p → GPp.
(g) Hp → HHp.
(h) Gp → GGp.
(i) FFp → Fp
(j) Gp → Fp.
(k) Gp → gp.
(l) Hp ∧ p ∧ Gp → GHp.
(m) Hp ∧ p ∧ gp → gHp.
(n) FGp → GFp.
(o) L(p → q) → (Lp → Lq).
(p) Lp → LLp.
(q) Lp → p.
(r) p → LMp.
(s) MPp → PMp.
(t) Hp ∧ ¬p ∧ Lq → GLH(M(Hp ∧ ¬p) → q).
2. Inference rules: let p be any atom, ϕ and ψ any two distinct formulas
(a) Substitution ϕ
ϕ(ψ/p)
.
(b) Generalization ϕ
Gϕ
; ϕ
Hϕ
; ϕ
Lϕ
.
(c) Modus Ponens ϕ,ϕ→ψ
ψ
.
(d) IRR rule Hp∧L¬p→ϕ
ϕ
where p is an atom not occurring in ϕ.
We say that ϕ is provable, written  ϕ, if, for some sequence of formulas
ψ1, ..., ψm = ϕ, we have that, for each i = 1, ..., m, ψi is either an axiom or is
obtained from some formulas in {ψ1, ..., ψi−1} by the application of an inference
rule. A set of formulas  syntactically entails ϕ, written   ϕ, if there are formulas
ψ1, ..., ψm ∈  such that  ψ1 ∧ ... ∧ ψm → ϕ.
3 Soundness and Strong Completeness Theorem
In this section the Soundness and Strong Completeness Theorem is proved. In
Section 3.1 a number of preliminary results are given. In Section 3.2 the notion of IRR
theory is defined and studied. In Section 3.3, for each IRR complete consistent theory
, a Kripke frame associated to  is defined. This Kripke frame is obtained through
a selective filtration over the canonical model associated with the Hilbert System.
This filtration is adapted from [2]. In Section 3.4, given an arbitrary IRR complete
consistent theory , the associated Kripke frame is turned into a model (over a bun-
dled I -tree) for . This model is defined through a filtration adapted from [7]. These
results are then used in Section 3.5 to prove the Soundness and Strong Completeness
Theorem.
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3.1 Preliminary Results
In this Section a number of preliminary results are introduced. They will be used to
study IRR theories in Sections 3.2 and 3.3.
Proposition 11 The following are provable results:
1. if  p → q then  Gp → Gq .
2. if  p → q then  Fp → Fq .
3. if  p → q then  gp → gq .
4. if  p → q then  fp → f q .
5. if  p → q then  Hp → Hq .
6. if  p → q then  Pp → Pq .
7.  G(p ∧ q) ↔ Gp ∧ Gq .
8.  f (p ∧ q) → fp ∧ f q .
9.  P(p ∧ q) → Pp ∧ Pq .
10.  Gp → fp.
11.  fgp → fp.
12.  Gp ∧ f q → f (p ∧ q).
13.  Gp ∧ Fq → F(p ∧ q).
14.  Fp ∧ gq → f (p ∧ q).
15.  Hp ∧ Pq → P(p ∧ q).
16.  gHp → p.
17. If  p → q , then  Lp → Lq .
18. If  p → q , then  Mp → Mq .
19.  Lp ∧ Mq → M(p ∧ q)
20.  Hp ∧ p ∧ gp → Hgp.
21.  Hp ∧ gq → gH(P¬p → q).
Proof Here is a sketch of the proofs.
1. Straight from axiom 1c (G(p → q) → (Gp → Gq)).
2. Straight from axiom 1d (G(p → q) → (Fp → Fq)).
3. By axiom 1d (G(p → q) → (Fp → Fq)),  F¬q → F¬p.
4. By axiom 1c (G(p → q) → (Gp → Gq)),  G¬q → G¬p.
5. Straight from axiom 1b (H(p → q) → (Hp → Hq)).
6. By axiom 1b (H(p → q) → (Hp → Hq)),  H¬q → H¬p.
7. (→):  G(p ∧ q) → Gp and  G(p ∧ q) → Gq . (←): Gp → (Gq →
G(p ∧ q)).
8. By Proposition 11.4,  f (p ∧ q) → fp and  f (p ∧ q) → f q .
9. By Proposition 11.6,  P(p ∧ q) → Pp and  P(p ∧ q) → Pq .
10. Straight from axioms 1j (Gp → Fp) and 1k (Gp → gp).
11. By axiom 1j (Gp → Fp),  fgp → ffp. Thus, by axiom 1h (Gp → GGp),
 fgp → fp.
12.  Gp → (G¬(p ∧ q) → G¬q). Thus,  Gp → (¬G¬q → ¬G¬(p ∧ q)).
13.  Gp → (Fq → F(p ∧ q)).
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14. By axiom 1d (G(p → q) → (Fp → Fq)),  G¬(p ∧ q) → (Fp → F¬q).
Thus, Fp ∧ ¬F¬q → ¬G¬(p ∧ q).
15.  Hp → (H¬(p ∧ q) → H¬q). Thus,  Hp → (¬H¬q → ¬H¬(p ∧ q)).
16. Straight from axioms 1f (p → GPp) and 1j (Gp → Fp).
17. Straight from axiom 1o (L(p → q) → (Lp → Lq)).
18. By axiom 1o (L(p → q) → (Lp → Lq)),  L¬q → L¬p.
19.  Lp → (L¬(p ∧ q) → L¬q). Thus,  Lp → (¬L¬q → ¬L¬(p ∧ q)).
20. By axiom 1f (p → GPp),  PFp → PFGPp. By axiom 1n (FGp →
GFp), PFGPp → PGFPp. Thus,  PFp → PGFPp. Thus, by axiom 1e
(p → Hfp),  PFp → FPp. Thus,  gHp → Hgp. Thus, by axiom 1m
(Hp ∧ p ∧ gp → gHp), Hp ∧ p ∧ gp → Hgp.
21.  Hp → ¬P¬p ∨ q . Thus, by axiom 1g (Hp → HHp), Hp → H(¬P¬p ∨
q). Moreover, gq → g(¬P¬p ∨ q). Thus, Hp ∧ gq → H(¬P¬p ∨ q) ∧
(¬P¬p ∨ q) ∧ g(¬P¬p ∨ q). Thus, by axiom 1m (Hp ∧ p ∧ gp → gHp),
Hp ∧ gq → gH(¬P¬p ∨ q).
Proposition 12  P(p ∧ Fq) → P(Pp ∧ q) ∨ q ∨ Fq .
Proof Let ϕ stand for Pp∧q . Easily,  P(p∧Fq) → P(GPp∧Fq),  P(GPp∧
Fq) → PF(Pp ∧ q). Thus
 P(p ∧ Fq) → PFϕ. (1)
Moreover  ¬P(Pp∧q) → H¬(Pp∧q),  ¬q → ¬(Pp∧q), ¬Fq → g¬(Pp∧
q). This yields  ¬P(Pp∧q)∧¬q∧¬Fq → H¬ϕ∧¬ϕ∧g¬ϕ. Proposition 11.20
(Hp ∧ p ∧ gp → Hgp) gives
 ¬P(Pp ∧ q) ∧ ¬q ∧ ¬Fq → Hg¬ϕ. (2)
Combining Eqs. 1 and 2, we obtain
 P(p ∧ Fq) ∧ ¬P(Pp ∧ q) ∧ ¬q ∧ ¬Fq → PFϕ ∧ Hg¬ϕ.
Therefore,  ¬(P (p ∧ Fq) ∧ ¬P(Pp ∧ q) ∧ ¬q ∧ ¬Fq).
Definition 13  is a variable ranging over {H,G,L}. ♦ abbreviates ¬¬. H−
stands for G, G− stands for H , L− stands for L.
Proposition 14 Let ϕ, ψ, χ1, χ2, ..., χn be formulas. If
 ϕ → 0(χ1 → 1(χ2 → ... → n−1(χn → n¬ψ))...) (3)
then
 ψ → −n (χn → −n−1(χn−1 → ... → −1 (χ1 → −0 ¬ϕ))...). (4)
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Proof First, we prove by induction on j = 0, 1, ..., n, that
 ♦j (χj+1 ∧ ♦j+1(χj+2 ∧ ... ∧ ♦n−1(χn ∧ ♦nψ))...)
→ (χj → −j−1(χj−1 → −j−2(χj−2 → ... → −1 (χ1 → −0 ¬ϕ))...). (5)
From (3), we obtain
 ♦0(χ1 ∧ ♦1(χ2 ∧ ... ∧ ♦n−1(χn ∧ ♦nψ))...) → ¬ϕ.
Hence,
 −0 ♦0(χ1 ∧ ♦1(χ2 ∧ ... ∧ ♦n−1(χn ∧ ♦nψ))...) → −0 ¬ϕ.
Axioms 1f (p → GPp), 1e (p → Hfp), 1r (p → LMp) and Modus Ponens entail
 (χ1 ∧ ♦1(χ2 ∧ ... ∧ ♦n−1(χn ∧ ♦nψ))...) → −0 ¬ϕ.
This is (5) for j = 0.
Consider a natural number m such that 0 ≤ m < n, and assume (5) for j = m.
Proceeding as before we get
 χm+1 ∧ ♦m+1(χm+2 ∧ ... ∧ ♦n−1(χn ∧ ♦nψ))...)
→ −m(χm → −m−1(χm−1 → ... → −1 (χ1 → −0 ¬ϕ))...).
With a little bit of propositional work, this gives (5) for j = m + 1.
Therefore
 ♦nψ → (χn → −n−1...−1 (χ1 → −0 ¬ϕ))...).
The same procedure yields (4).
3.2 IRR Complete Consistent Theories
IRR theories are introduced in order to obtain a number of properties for the Kripke
frame defined in Section 3.3. In particular, points 3 and 4 of Proposition 38, which
are consequences of respectively Propositions 25 and 26. The peculiarity of the IRR
theories is that they contain a “name” (a formula of the form Hp ∧ L¬p, for some
atom p) for themselves and for each theory finitely reachable by a sequence of R ∪
R−1 ∪ S-steps. This fact immediately yields Proposition 25, and allow the use of
axiom 1t to prove Proposition 26.
Remark 15 The use of IRR complete consistent theories is allowed by Proposi-
tions 18 and 19. In proving these propositions, the IRR rule is crucial.
Definition 16 A theory  is consistent if, for every n ∈ N, every ϕ1, ϕ2, ...ϕn ∈ ,
 ¬∧ni=1 ϕi . It is complete if, for all formulas ϕ, ϕ ∈  or ¬ϕ ∈ . It is IRR if the
following conditions hold:
1. For some atom p, Hp ∧ L¬p ∈ .
2. For each formula ϕ ∈ , for each n ∈ N, if ϕ can be read as ♦1(ψ1 ∧ ♦2(ψ2 ∧
... ∧ ♦nψn))...), then for some q not occurring in ϕ, ♦1(ψ1 ∧ ♦2(ψ2 ∧ ... ∧
♦n(Hq ∧ L¬q ∧ ψn))...) ∈ .
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Remark 17 It is easily provable that, for each n ∈ N, if a formula ϕ can be read as
♦0(ψ0 ∧♦1(ψ1 ∧ ...∧♦nψn))...) and as ♦′0(ψ ′0 ∧♦′1(ψ ′1 ∧ ...∧♦′nψ ′n))...), then, for
all i = 0, 1, ..., n, ♦i = ♦′i and ψi = ψ ′i .
Proposition 18 If  is a consistent theory and p an atom not occurring in any
ϕ ∈ , then  ∪ {Hp ∧ L¬p} is consistent.
Proof Suppose  ∪ {Hp ∧ L¬p} is inconsistent. Then, there is n ∈ N and
δ0, δ1, ..., δn ∈  such that
 ¬
(
Hp ∧ L¬p ∧
n∧
i=0
δn
)
.
By propositional logic, this is equivalent to
 Hp ∧ L¬p → ¬
n∧
i=0
δn.
By IRR rule, this yields
 ¬
n∧
i=0
δn,
which is against the consistency of .
Proposition 19 Let ′ be a consistent theory such that the number of atoms not
occurring in any ϕ ∈ ′ is infinite. Then, there is an IRR complete consistent theory
 such that ′ ⊆ .
Proof Define0 = ′∪{Hp∧L¬p}, for some atom p not occurring in any ϕ ∈ ′.
By Proposition 18, 0 is consistent.
Let (ψ0, m0), (ψ1, m1), ... be an enumeration of all pair (ψi, mi), where ψi is a
formula, and, if mi = 0, then ψi cannot be read as ♦1(ψ1 ∧♦2(ψ2 ∧ ...∧♦nψn))...),
if mi = 0, then ψi can be read as ♦1(ψ1 ∧♦2(ψ2 ∧ ...∧♦miψmi ))...). Moreover, we
can assume that ϕi is readable as ♦1(ψ1 ∧♦2(ψ2 ∧ ...∧ ♦nψn))...) if and only if i is
odd.
Assume n was defined. Either n ∪ {ψn} or n ∪ {¬ψn} is consistent. If n ∪
{¬ψn} is consistent, set n+1 = n ∪ {¬ψn}. Otherwise, if n is even set n+1 =
n ∪ {ψn}. If n is odd, ψn can be read as ♦1(ψ1 ∧♦2(ψ2 ∧ ...∧♦mnψmn))...). Since
the number of atoms not occurring in any ϕ ∈  is infinite, we can pick an atom
q not occurring in any ϕ ∈ n ∪ {ψn}. Denote ♦1(ψ1 ∧ ♦2(ψ2 ∧ ... ∧ ♦mn(Hq ∧
L¬q ∧ ψmn))...) with ψn(q). We claim that n ∪ {ψn(q)} is consistent. If not, there
is m ∈ N and δ0, δ1, ..., δm ∈ n such that  ¬(∧mi=0 δi ∧ ψn(q)). By propositional
logic, that is

m∧
i=0
δi → 1(ψ1 → 2(ψ2 → ... → mn¬(Hq ∧ L¬q ∧ ψmn))...).
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Thus, by Proposition 14,
Hq∧L¬q∧ψmn →−mn
(
ψmn−1 → −mn−1
(
ψmn−2 → ... → −1 ¬
m∧
i=0
δi
))
...
)
.
Hence, by propositional logic,
Hq∧L¬q →
(
ψmn →−mn
(
ψmn−1 →−mn−1
(
ψmn−2 → ...→−1 ¬
m∧
i=0
δi
))
...
)
.
Thus, by IRR rule,
 ψmn → −mn
(
ψmn−1 → −mn−1
(
ψmn−2 → ... → −1 ¬
m∧
i=0
δi
))
...
)
.
Hence, by Proposition 14,

m∧
i=0
δi → 1(ψ1 → 2(ψ2 → ... → mn¬ψmn))...).
By propositional logic, that is  ¬(∧mi=0 δi ∧ ψn). This contradicts the consis-
tency of n ∪ {ψn} and the claim is proved. Easily,  ψn(q) → ψn. Hence,
n ∪ {ψn(q)} ∪ {ψn} is consistent as well. Define n+1 = n ∪ {ψn(q)} ∪ {ψn}.
Easily,  = ⋃n∈N n is as desired.
Proposition 20 Let , 
 be complete consistent theories. The following conditions
are equivalent:
1. For every formula ϕ, Gϕ ∈  implies ϕ ∈ 
.
2. For every formula ϕ, ϕ ∈ 
 implies f ϕ ∈ .
3. For every formula ϕ, Hϕ ∈ 
 implies ϕ ∈ .
4. For every formula ϕ, ϕ ∈  implies Pϕ ∈ 
.
Proof From 1. to 2. Assume 1. and that ϕ ∈ 
 and fϕ ∈ . Then, by completeness
of , G¬ϕ ∈  whence, by 1., ¬ϕ ∈ 
, against the consistency of 
.
From 2. to 3. Assume 2. and that Gϕ ∈ 
 and ¬ϕ ∈ . Then, by 2., fHϕ ∈ 
and, by completeness of , ¬ϕ ∈ . Then, by axiom 1f (p → GPp), GP¬ϕ ∈ ,
against the consistency of .
From 3. to 4. Similarly to from 1. to 2. From 4. to 1., similarly to from 2. to 3.,
using axiom 1e (p → Hfp).
Definition 21 Let ,
 be IRR complete consistent theories. Define  ≺ 
 if one
of the previous conditions holds. Define   
 if  = 
 or  ≺ 
. 
   stands
for  ≺ 
. 
   stands for   
.
Proposition 22 Let , 
 be complete consistent theories. The following conditions
are equivalent:
1. For every formula ϕ, Lϕ ∈  implies ϕ ∈ 
.
A. Gatto
2. For every formula ϕ, ϕ ∈ 
 implies Mϕ ∈ .
Proof Similarly to proof of Proposition 20, from 1. to 2.
Definition 23 Let ,
 be two IRR complete consistent theories. Define  ∼ 
 if
one of the previous conditions holds.
Proposition 24 Let ϕ be a formula and  an IRR complete consistent theory such
that f ϕ ∈  (respectively Pϕ ∈ , Mϕ ∈ ). Then there is an IRR maximal
consistent theory 
 such that  ≺ 
 (respectively   
,  ∼ 
) and ϕ ∈ 
.
Proof By definition of IRR theory, we have
f (Hp ∧ L¬p ∧ ϕ) ∈ 
for some atom p. {Hp ∧ L¬p ∧ ϕ} ∪ {ψ |Gψ ∈ } is consistent. Otherwise
¬f (Hp ∧ L¬p ∧ ϕ) ∈ .
Define 
0 = {Hp ∧ L¬p ∧ ϕ} ∪ {ψ |Gψ ∈ }.
For the n+1 case proceed as in Proposition 19, but, if 
n∪{¬ψn} is not consistent
and n is odd, make sure that there is an atom q such that q does not occur in ψn and

n ∪ {ψn(q)} is consistent. We claim that
f
(
Hp ∧ L¬p ∧ ϕ ∧
∧
(
n − 
0) ∧ ψn
)
∈ .
Suppose not, then,
G¬
(
Hp ∧ L¬p ∧ ϕ ∧
∧
(
n − 
0) ∧ ψn
)
∈ .
Thus,
¬
(
Hp ∧ L¬p ∧ ϕ ∧
∧
(
n − 
0) ∧ ψn
)
∈ 
0 ⊆ 
n.
This is against the consistency of 
n ∪ {ψn}. Therefore,
f (Hp ∧ L¬p ∧ ϕ ∧
∧
(
n − 
0) ∧ ψn(q)) ∈ 
for q such as in Definition 16.2, i.e. not occurring in
f
(
Hp ∧ L¬p ∧ ϕ ∧
∧
(
n − 
0) ∧ ψn
)
and, thus, not occurring in ψn. Suppose 
n ∪ {ψn(q)} is inconsistent. Then, for ψ
with Gψ ∈  such that
 ¬
(
Hp ∧ L¬p ∧ ϕ ∧ ψ ∧
∧
(
n − 
0) ∧ ψn(q)
)
.
Hence,
 ¬f
(
Hp ∧ L¬p ∧ ϕ ∧ ψ ∧
∧
(
n − 
0) ∧ ψn(q)
)
.
Thus,
¬f
(
Hp ∧ L¬p ∧ ϕ ∧ ψ ∧
∧
(
n − 
0) ∧ ψn(q)
)
∈ .
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However,
f
(
Hp ∧ L¬p ∧ ϕ ∧
∧
(
n − 
0) ∧ ψn(q)
)
∈ 
and
Gψ ∈ .
Then, Proposition 11.12 ( Gp ∧ f q → f (p ∧ q)) yields
f
(
Hp ∧ L¬p ∧ ϕ ∧
m∧
i=0
ψi ∧
∧
(
n − 
0) ∧ ψn(q)
)
∈ .
This is a contradiction. Therefore 
n ∪{ψn(q)} is consistent and q as desired. Define

 = ⋃n∈N 
n.
The cases in which Pϕ ∈  or Mϕ ∈  are similar.
Proposition 25 ≺ ∩ ∼= ∅.
Proof Suppose not. Then, there are two IRR complete consistent theories , 
 such
that  ≺ 
 and  ∼ 
. However, for some atom p, Hp ∧ L¬p ∈ 
. Thus, p ∈ 
and ¬p ∈ .
Proposition 26 Let , 
, 
′ be IRR complete consistent theories. If  ≺ 
 and

 ∼ 
′ then there is an IRR complete consistent theory ′ such that  ∼ ′ and
′ ≺ 
′.
Proof For some atom p, Hp ∧ ¬p ∈ . Thus, MP(Hp ∧ ¬p) ∈ 
′. Hence,
by axiom 1s (MPp → PMp), PM(Hp ∧ ¬p) ∈ 
′. So there is ′ < 
′ with
M(Hp∧¬p) ∈ ′. We claim that ∼ ′. Assume Lϕ ∈ . Axiom 1t (Hp∧¬p∧
Lq → GLH(M(Hp ∧ ¬p) → q)) entails ϕ ∈ ′.
Remark 27 We also proved that for every′ ≺ 
′ with M(Hp∧¬p) ∈ ′,  ∼ ′.
Proposition 28 ≺ is a transitive, upward endless and downward linear relation over
the set of IRR complete consistent theories.
Proof Transitivity easily follows from axiom 1h (Gp → GGp). Upward end-
lessness easily follows from Proposition 11.10 ( Gp → fp) (which is obtained
combining axioms 1j (Gp → Fp) and 1k (Gp → gp) and yields  f).
Let us show downward linearity. Suppose we have, 
1 and 
2 with 
1, 
2 ≺ ,

1 = 
2, 
1 ≺ 
2 and 
2 ≺ 
1. Hence, there are χ1, χ2 and χ3 such that χ1 ∈ 
1,
χ1 ∈ 
2, χ2 ∈ 
1, f χ2 ∈ 
2, χ3 ∈ 
1 and Pχ3 ∈ 
2. Thus, P(χ1 ∧ χ2 ∧ χ3) ∈ 
and fP (χ1 ∧ χ2 ∧ χ3) ∈ 
2. Applying axiom 1l (Hp ∧ p ∧ Gp → GHp) and
Proposition 118 ( f (p ∧ q) → fp ∧ f q) and 119 ( P(p ∧ q) → Pp ∧ Pq), we
obtain a contradiction.
Proposition 29 ∼ is an equivalence relation over the set of IRR complete consistent
theories.
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Proof Easy using axiom 1q (Lp → p) for reflexivity, 1r (p → LMp) for symmetry,
1p (Lp → LLp) for transitivity.
Proposition 30 Let ϕ be a formula, and 
, IRR complete consistent theories. Sup-
pose 
 ≺ , Fϕ ∈ 
 and ¬(ϕ ∨ Fϕ) ∈ . Then there exists an IRR complete
consistent theory  such that 
 ≺  ≺  and ϕ ∈ .
Proof By definition of IRR theory, for some atom p, Hp∧L¬p ∈ 
. Thus, P(Hp∧
L¬p ∧ Fϕ) ∈ . Proposition 12 ( P(p ∧ Fq) → P(Pp ∧ q) ∨ q ∨ Fq)) entails
P(P (Hp ∧ L¬p) ∧ ϕ) ∈ . Hence, for some q such as in Definition 16.2,
P(Hq ∧ ¬q ∧ P(Hp ∧ ¬p) ∧ ϕ) ∈ . (6)
Let ψp be Hp ∧ ¬p, ψq be Hq ∧ ¬q .
Define 0 = {ψq ∧ ϕ} ∪ {Pγ |γ ∈ 
} ∪ {δ|Hδ ∈ }. We claim that 0 is
consistent. Otherwise, for γ ∈ 
, δ such that Hδ ∈ ,
 ¬(ψq ∧ ϕ ∧ Pγ ∧ δ).
Thus,
¬P(ψq ∧ ϕ ∧ Pγ ∧ δ) ∈ .
However,
H(ψp → γ ) ∈ .
For, suppose not, P(ψp∧¬γ ) ∈ . Thus, there is 
′ such that
′ ≺  andψp∧¬γ ∈

′. Then, by downward linearity, 
 ≺ 
′ or 
 = 
′ or 
  
′ and this is against
ψp ∧ γ ∈ 
. Hence, because of axiom 1g (H → HHp),
HH(ψp → γ ) ∈ .
Then, by (6) and Proposition 11.15 ( Hp ∧ Pq → P(p ∧ q)),
P(ψq ∧ ϕ ∧ P(ψp ∧ (ψp → γ )) ∧ δ) ∈ .
Thus,
P(ψq ∧ ϕ ∧ Pγ ∧ δ) ∈ .
This is a contradiction and the claim is proved.
For the n + 1 case we proceed as in Proposition19, but, if n ∪ {¬ψn} is not
consistent and n is odd, we make sure that there is an atom r such that r does not
occur in ψn and n ∪ {ψm(r)} is consistent. We claim that
P
(
ψq ∧ Pψp ∧ ϕ ∧
∧
(n − 0) ∧ ψn
)
∈ .
Suppose not, then
H¬
(
ψq ∧ Pψp ∧ ϕ ∧
∧
(n − 0) ∧ ψn
)
∈ .
Thus,
¬
(
ψq ∧ Pψp ∧ ϕ ∧
∧
(n − 0) ∧ ψn
)
∈ 0 ⊆ n.
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However, since, being ψp ∈ 
, Pψp ∈ 0, this is against the consistency of 
n ∪
{ψn}. Therefore,
P
(
ψq ∧ Pψp ∧ ϕ ∧
∧
(n − 0) ∧ ψn(r)
)
∈ ,
for r such as in Definition 16.2, i.e. not occurring in P(ψq ∧ Pψp ∧ ϕ ∧ ∧(n −
0)∧ψn(r)) and, thus, not occurring in ψn(r). Suppose 
n ∪ {ψ(r)} is inconsistent,
then, for γ ∈ 
 and δ with Hδ ∈ ,
 ¬
(
ψp ∧ Pψq ∧ ϕ ∧
∧
(n − 0) ∧ ψn(r) ∧ Pγ ∧ δ
)
.
However,
P
(
ψq ∧ Pψp ∧ ϕ ∧
∧
(n − 0) ∧ ψn(r)
)
∈ .
Observe that, as before, H(ψp → γ ) ∈ . Then, reasoning as before,
P
(
ψq ∧ Pψp ∧ ϕ ∧
∧
(n − 0) ∧ ψn(r) ∧ Pγ
)
∈ .
Finally, since Hδ ∈ , by Proposition 11.15 ( Hp ∧ Pq → P(p ∧ q)),
P
(
ψq ∧ Pψp ∧ ϕ ∧
∧
(n − 0) ∧ ψn(r) ∧ Pγ ∧ δ
)
∈ .
This is a contradiction and r is as desired. Define  = ⋃m∈N m.
3.3 Kripke Frame
In this section, for each IRR complete consistent theory , a particular Kripke frame
is defined. It has, as domain, a set of arbitrary points and, as relations, a relation R
and a relation S. It is related to the canonical model associated to the Hilbert System
by means of a function C, named, as in [2], chronicle. More precisely, C associates
each point to an IRR complete consistent theory, and for every couple of points x, y,
if xRy (respectively, xSy) then C(x) ≺ C(y) (respectively, C(x) ∼ C(y)).
The reason why this Kripke frame, instead of the canonical model restricted to the
set of the IRR complete consistent theories, is considered is that the structure needed
to perform the filtration of Section 3.4 is “slightly” different from the structure of
the canonical model restricted to the set of the IRR complete consistent theories. In
particular, we want no history to be completely S-related to any other history. This
property will be crucial in defining the indistinguishability relations over the frame
of the model built in Section 3.4.
This Kripke frame is built following the construction provided in [2]. There,
Peircean logic was considered. Here, the Ockhamist operatorL is also present. There-
fore, here, in addition to the G,F and H cases (Propositions 34, 35 and 36), treated
also in [2, cf Lemmas 3.9, 3.10, 3.12], the L case is also treated (Proposition 37).
Definition 31 A Kripke-frame is a 3-tuple (W,R, S) where W is a set and R and S
are binary relations on W .
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Definition 32 A chronicle on a Kripke-frameF = (W,R, S) is a function C assign-
ing to each w ∈ W an IRR complete consistent theory in such a way that wRv
implies C(w) ≺ C(v) and wSv implies C(w) ∼ C(v).
Definition 33 Consider the following conditions over a chronicleC on a linear order
I = (I, R) (a linear order (I, R) can be viewed as a Kripke frame (I, R,∅)):
1. For each formulaψ , each i, j ∈ I such that iRj ,Pψ ∈ C(j) andψ, Pψ ∈ C(i),
there is k ∈ I such that iRk, kRj and ψ ∈ C(k).
2. For each formulaψ , each i, j ∈ I such that iRj ,Fψ ∈ C(i) andψ, Fψ ∈ C(j),
there is k ∈ I such that iRk, kRj and ψ ∈ C(k).
3. For each formula ψ , each i ∈ I such that Pψ ∈ C(i), there is j ∈ I such that
jRi and ψ ∈ C(j).
4. For each formula ψ , each i ∈ I such that Fψ ∈ C(i), there is j ∈ I such that
iRj and ψ ∈ C(j).
If C satisfies 1, 2, 3, it is called historic. If C satisfies 1, 2, 4, it is called prophetic. If
C satisfies 1, 2, 3, 4, it is called perfect.
All of the following propositions, from Proposition 34 to Proposition 36, follow
a similar pattern. A linear order I and a chronicle C on I satisfying some of the
requirements of Definition 33 must be defined. Note that these requirements are exis-
tential. I and C are defined inductively. At step 0, a linear order I0 and a chronicle
C0 on I0 is defined. At step n + 1, the satisfaction by In and Cn of a particular
instance of the desired requirements is checked. If such an instance is not satisfied,
the missing elements are added and the chronicle on these new elements defined. The
resulting linear order and chronicle define In+1 and Cn+1. I is then defined as the
union of the In and C as the union of the Cn.
Proposition 34 For every IRR complete consistent theory , there is a linear order
I = (I, R) and a historic chronicle C on I such that I has a last element i, with
C(i) = .
Proof Step 0. Consider a new object i and define I0 = (I0, R0), where I0 = {i},
R0 = ∅, and C0 = {(i, )}.
Let ϕ1, ϕ2, ... be an enumeration of all the formulas of the form Pψ or Fψ such
that every ϕ occurs infinitely many times.
Step n+1. Suppose ϕn+1 is Pψ . List the elements of In in Rn order:
im, im−1, ..., i1(= i). Consider i1. If Pψ ∈ Cn(i1) or Pψ ∨ ψ ∈ Cn(i2), go
to i2. Otherwise, by Proposition 24, there is an IRR complete consistent theory

, with Cn(i2) ≺ 
 ≺ Cn(i1) and ψ ∈ 
. Add an element i ′1 between i1 and
i2 to In, and (i ′1, 
) to Cn. Go to i2. Proceed in this way till im is reached. If
Pψ ∈ Cn(im), stop. Otherwise, by Proposition 24, there is an IRR complete consis-
tent theory 
, with 
 ≺ Cn(im) and ψ ∈ 
. Add an element i ′m before im to In, and
(i ′m, 
) to Cn. Call the resulting structure In+1 = (In+1, Rn+1), and the resulting
chronicle Cn+1.
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Suppose ϕn+1 is Fψ . List the elements of In in Rn order: im, im−1, ..., i1(= i).
Consider im. If Fψ ∈ Cn(im) or Fψ ∨ ψ ∈ Cn(im−1), go to im−1. Otherwise, by
Proposition 30, there is an IRR complete consistent theory , with Cn(im) ≺  ≺
Cn(im−1) and ψ ∈ . Add an element i ′1 between im and im−1 to In and (i ′m,)
to Cn. Go to im−1. Proceed in this way till i1 is reached and stop, without adding
any new object after i1. Call the resulting structure In+1 = (In+1, Rn+1), and the
resulting chronicle Cn+1.
Define I = (I, R) as the union of all the In, and C as the union of all the Cn.
Proposition 35 For every formula ψ , for every IRR complete consistent theory ,
with fψ ∈ , there exists a linear order I = (I, R) and a prophetic chronicle C
on I such that I has a first element i, with C(i) = , and there is j , with iRj and
ψ ∈ C(j).
Proof Step 0. Proposition 24 assures that there exists 
 with  ≺ 
 and ψ ∈ 
.
Consider new objects i, j and define I0 = (I0, R0), where I0 = {i, j}, R0 = {(i, j)},
and C0 = {(i, ), (j, 
)}.
Let ϕ1, ϕ2, ... be an enumeration of all the formulas of the form Pψ or Fψ such
that every ϕ occurs infinitely many times.
Step n+1. Suppose ϕn+1 is Fψ . List the elements of In in Rn order:
(i =)i1, i2, ..., iM . Consider i1. If Fψ ∈ Cn(i1) or Fψ ∨ ψ ∈ Cn(i2), go to i2. Oth-
erwise, there is an IRR complete consistent theory, with Cn(i1) ≺  ≺ Cn(i2) and
ψ ∈ . Add an element i ′1 between i1 and i2 to In, and (i ′1, ) to Cn. Go to i2. Pro-
ceed in this way till iM is reached. If Fψ ∈ Cn(iM), stop. Otherwise, by axiom 1k
(Gp → gp) and Proposition 24, there is an IRR complete consistent theory 
, with
Cn(iM) ≺ 
 and ψ ∈ 
. Add an element i ′M after iM to In, and (i ′M, 
) to Cn. Call
the resulting structure In+1 = (In+1, Rn+1), and the resulting chronicle Cn+1.
Suppose ϕn+1 is Pψ . List the elements of In in Rn order: (i =)i1, i2, ..., iM .
Consider iM . If Pψ ∈ Cn(iM) or Pψ ∨ψ ∈ Cn(iM−1), go to iM−1. Otherwise, there
is an IRR complete consistent theory 
 with Cn(iM−1) ≺ 
 ≺ Cn(iM) and ψ ∈ 
.
Add an element i ′M between iM and iM−1 to In, and (i ′M, 
) to Cn. Go to iM−1.
Proceed in this way till i1 is reached and stop, without adding any new object after i1.
Call the resulting structure In+1 = (In+1, Rn+1), and the resulting chronicle Cn+1.
Define I = (I, R) as the union of all the In, and C as the union of all the Cn.
Proposition 36 For every formula ψ , every IRR complete consistent theory , with
gψ ∈ , there exists a linear order I = (I, R) and a prophetic chronicle C on I
such that I has a first element i, with C(i) = , and for all j , with iRj , ψ ∈ C(j).
Proof Consider the case in which ψ is Hχ , for some formula χ . Proceed as in
Proposition 35, with only the following modifications:
1. At step 0, use axioms 1i (FFp → Fp) and 1j (Gp → Fp) to find an IRR
complete consistent theory 
, with  ≺ 
 and gHχ ∈ .
2. At each step n > 0, if zM,n is the last element of In, assure that gHχ ∈
Cn(zM,n), proceeding as follows:
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(a) According to the proof of Proposition 35, the last element of In+1 is differ-
ent from the last element of In only when ϕn is Fϑ , for some formula ϑ , and
Fϑ ∈ Cn(zM,n). Now, if Fϑ ∧ gHχ ∈ Cn(zM,n), by axiom 1i (FFp →
Fp) and Proposition 11.14 ( Fp ∧ gq → f (p ∧ q)), f (ϑ ∧ gHχ) ∈
Cn(zM,n). Therefore, we can assure that gHχ ∈ Cn+1(zM,n+1) as well.
At the end, by axiom 1j (Gp → Fp), for every i ∈ I , there is j ∈ I , with iRj and
gHχ ∈ C(j). Hence, fgHχ ∈ C(i). Applying Proposition 11.11 ( fgp → fp)
and and axiom 1f (p → GPp), χ ∈ C(i).
Suppose ψ is an arbitrary formula. For some atom p, Hp ∧ ¬p ∈ . Thus,
using Proposition 11.21 ( Hp ∧ gq → gH(P¬p → q)), gH(P¬p → ψ) ∈ .
Therefore, there exists a linear order I = (I, R) and a prophetic chronicle C on I
such that I has a first element i, with C(i) = , and, for every element j ∈ I
P¬p → ψ ∈ C(j). Therefore, for every j ∈ I , with iRj , ψ ∈ C(j).
Proposition 37 For every formula ψ , every linear order I = (I, R) with a first
element i, every historic chronicle C on I, with Mψ ∈ C(i), there exists a linear
order I ′ = (I ′, R′), with a first element i ′, and a historic chronicle C′ on I ′ such
that ψ ∈ C′(i ′) and, for all j ∈ I there is j ′ ∈ I ′, with C(j) ∼ C′(j ′), and for all
j ′ ∈ I ′ there is j ∈ I , with C′(j ′) ∼ C(j).
Proof Proposition 24 assures that there is 
 with C(i) ∼ 
 and ψ ∈ 
. Consider
a new object i ′ and define I ′ = {i ′} and C′(i ′) = 
. For all j ∈ I , with jRi, by
Proposition 26, there is 
j such thatC(j) ∼ 
j and 
j ≺ 
. Thus, for all j ∈ I , with
jRi, add a new object j ′ to I ′ and define C′(j ′) = 
j . Finally, for every j ′, k′ ∈ I ′,
define j ′R′k′ if and only if C′(j ′) ≺ C′(k′).
Consider any formulaψ and any j ′ ∈ I ′, with Pψ ∈ C′(j ′). Then, by Proposition
24, there is 
′, with 
′ ≺ C(j ′) andψ ∈ 
′. Thus, by Proposition 26, there is 
, with

 ≺ C(j) and 
 ∼ 
′. For some p, Hp∧L¬p ∈ 
. Hence, P(Hp∧L¬p) ∈ C(j).
Then, there is k ∈ I , with kRj and Hp ∧ L¬p ∈ C(k). Therefore, by downward
linearity of ≺, 
 = C(k). Thus, there is k′ ∈ I ′, with 
 ∼ C(k′). Therefore, by
downward linearity of ≺ and ≺ ∩ ∼= ∅, 
′ = C′(k′).
Similarly, given any ψ and any j ′, l′ ∈ I ′ with l′R′j ′, Pψ ∈ C′(j ′) and ¬ψ ∧
¬Pψ ∈ C′(l′), there is k′ ∈ I ′, with l′R′k′, k′R′j ′ and ψ ∈ C′(k′); given any
formula ψ and any j ′, l′ ∈ I ′, with j ′R′l′, Fψ ∈ C′(j ′) and ¬ψ ∧ ¬Fψ ∈ C′(l′),
there is k′ ∈ I ′, with j ′R′k′, k′R′l′ and ψ ∈ C′(k′).
The following proposition shows how to build, for each IRR complete consistent
theory , the desired Kripke frame. Again, some existential requirements must be
satisfied, an inductive construction will be performed, and, at each step, the missing
part of the frame and the associated part of the chronicle will be added by means of
Propositions from 34 to 37.
Proposition 38 For every IRR complete consistent theory , there is a Kripke-frame
F = (W,R, S) and a chronicle C on F such that there is w ∈ W with C(w) = ,
and for each w ∈ W , each formula ψ:
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1. R is transitive, downward linear and upward endless.
2. S is an equivalence relation.
3. R ∩ S = ∅.
4. For each v, v′ ∈ W , if wRv and vSv′, there is w′ such that wSw′ and w′Rv′.
5. There is h ∈ Hw such that C  h (where C  h means C restricted to h) is a
perfect chronicle.
6. If fψ ∈ C(w), there is h ∈ Hw such that C  h is a perfect chronicle, and there
is v ∈ h, with wRv and ψ ∈ C(v).
7. If gψ ∈ C(w), there is h ∈ Hw such that C  h is a perfect chronicle, and for
all v ∈ h, with wRv, ψ ∈ C(v).
8. If Mψ ∈ C(w), there is v ∈ W , with wSv and ψ ∈ C(v).
Proof Let  be an arbitrary IRR complete consistent theory.
Step 0. By Proposition 34, there exists a Kripke-frameF = (I, R, S) and a historic
chronicle C on F such that S = {(i, i)|i ∈ I }, (I, R) is a linear order with a last
element i, and C(i) = . Define F0 = F and C0 = C.
Step n+1. Consider every pair (w, ϕ), where w ∈ Wn − Wn−1 and ϕ is a formula
in Cn(w) of the form fψ , gψ or Mψ .
Suppose ϕ is fψ . By Proposition 35, there exists a Kripke-frame F(w,ϕ) =
(I, R, S) and a prophetic chronicle C(w,ϕ) on F(w,ϕ) such that S = {(i, i)|i ∈ I },
(I, R) is a linear order with a first element i, C(w,ϕ)(i) = Cn(w), and there is j ∈ I
with iRj and ψ ∈ C(w,ϕ)(j). We can assume i = w and I − {i} disjoint from Wn.
Suppose ϕ is gψ . By Proposition 36, there exists a Kripke-frame F(w,ϕ) =
(I, R, S) and a prophetic chronicle C(w,ϕ) on F(w,ϕ) such that S = {(i, i)|i ∈ I },
(I, R) is a linear order with a first element i, C(w,ϕ)(i) = Cn(w), and for all j with
iRj , ψ ∈ C(w,ϕ)(j). We can assume i = w and I − {i} disjoint from Wn.
Suppose ϕ is Mψ . Assume that, if Iw denote {v ∈ Wn|vRn ∪ =w}, Cn  Iw is
historic on Iw (*). Thus, by Proposition 37, there exists a Kripke-frame F(w,ϕ) =
(I, R, S) and a historic chronicle C(w,ϕ) on F(w,ϕ) such that S = {(i, i)|i ∈ I },
(I, R) is a linear order such that it has a first element i with ψ ∈ C(w,ϕ)(i) and for
all v ∈ Iw, there is j ∈ I , with Cn(v) ∼ C(w,ϕ)(j), and for all j ∈ I , there is v ∈ Iw,
with Cn(v) ∼ C(w,ϕ)(j). We can assume I disjoint from Wn.
All the F(w,ϕ) −{w} can be assumed disjoint. Let Fn+1 be the union of Fn and all
theF(w,ϕ), andCn+1 the union ofCn and all theC(w,ϕ). For everyF(w,ϕ) = (I, R, S),
with ϕ of the form Mψ , for every i ∈ I , for every i ′ ∈ Iw with C(w,ϕ)(i ′) ∼ Cn(i),
add (i ′, i) and (i, i ′) to Sn, obtaining S0n+1. Close S
0
n+1 under transitivity, obtaining
Sn+1. Let F be the union of all the Fn and C the union of all the Cn.
It is easy to prove that assumption (∗) holds at step 0 and that, if assump-
tion (∗) holds at step n, then it holds at the step n + 1. Properties 1-8 easily
follow.
3.4 Model (Over a Bundled I -Tree)
In the previous section, for each IRR complete consistent theory , a Kripke frame
associated to  has been defined. In this section, given an arbitrary IRR complete
consistent theory , following [7, Section 7.7, pp. 299–306], the associated Kripke
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frame F = (W,R, S) is turned into a model (over a bundled I tree) for . This
is done by quotienting over S (S is an equivalence relation). The idea underly-
ing this filtration is the following. The points of the Kripke-frame F are meant to
represent equivalence classes modulo indistinguishability and the equivalence rela-
tion S represents the property that two classes are relative to the same moment
in time.
Indistinguishability relations and an evaluation are then defined over the resulting
frame and the resulting model is proved to satisfy .
Let  be an arbitrary IRR complete consistent theory and F = (W,R, S) and
C, respectively, the Kripke frame and the chronicle associated to  provided by
Proposition 38.
Definition 39 For all w ∈ W , define w = {v ∈ W |wSv}, and W = {w|w ∈ W }.
For all w, v ∈ W, define wRv if and only if there are w′ ∈ w and v′ ∈ v such that
w′Rv′.
Remark 40 By Proposition 38.4, given w, v ∈ W, with wRv, there is w′ ∈ w such
that w′Rv.
Proposition 41 R is an irreflexive, transitive, downward linear and upward endless
binary relation over W.
Proof Given any w ∈ W, suppose wRw. Then, by Remark 40, there is w′ ∈ w
with w′Rw. This contradicts R ∩ S = ∅. Therefore, R is irreflexive. Transitivity
and downward linearity easily follow from Remark 40 and the same proper-
ties for R. Upward endlessness for R easily follows from upward endlessness
for R.
Definition 42 For each h ∈ HF , define h = {w|w ∈ h}.
Definition 43 Given w ∈ W , define the date of birth of w, DOB(w), as the natural
number n such that w has been introduced at step n. Given w,w′ ∈ W such that
wSw′, define the date of birth of the relation S between w and w′, DOB(S, w,w′)
as the natural number n such that w and w′ have been S-related at step n.
Definition 44 Define the reflexive closure of R as R = {(w, v) ∈ W ×
W |wRv or w = v}.
Proposition 45 For every distinct w,w′ ∈ W , if wSw′ and DOB(S, w,w′) = n,
then:
1. Either for each v ∈ W such that vRw, DOB(v) = n;
2. Or for each v′ ∈ W such that v′Rw′, DOB(v′) = n.
Proof According to the construction, there are three ways in which w and w′ may
have been S-related:
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1. There is v such that: wRv, DOB(v) = n − 1, Mψ ∈ C(v) for some for-
mula ψ . Therefore, a new element v′, together with a new element w′, has been
introduced at step n to answer (v,Mψ). In this case, thesis is easily fulfilled.
2. There is v′ such that: w′Rv′, DOB(v′) = n − 1, Mψ ∈ C(v′) for some for-
mula ψ . Therefore, a new element v, together with a new element w, has been
introduced at step n to answer (v′,Mψ). In this case, thesis is easily fulfilled.
3. w and w′ has been S-related by performing the transitive closure of S0n . By def-
inition of transitive closure, there is m ∈ N and x1, x2, ..., xm ∈ Wn such that
w = x0S0nx1S0n...S0nxm+1 = w′ and such that, for each i, j = 0, 1, ..., m+1 with
i = j , xi = xj . Observe that S0n \ Sn−1 always relates an element whose DOB is
n − 1 with an element whose DOB is n. Thus, there must be i = 0, 1, ..., m + 1
such that DOB(xi) = n. Observe that, by construction, such an xi has been S0n-
related to one and only one element v and such a v ∈ Wn−1. Therefore, either w
orw′ must be xi . Assume, without loss of generality,w is xi . Then DOB(w) = n.
Observe that w has been S-related to an object different than w, namely w′, at
the same step w has been introduced. Therefore, by construction, there must be
v ∈ Wn such that wRv and such that v has been introduced at step n to answer
(v′,Mψ) for some v′ ∈ Wn−1 and formula ψ . Thesis easily follows.
Corollary 46 Consider distinct w,w′ ∈ W such that wSw′ and DOB(S, w,w′) =
n. Then, for each v ∈ W such that wRv and such that there is v′ ∈ W with w′Rv′
and vSv′, we have DOB(v) ≤ n.
Proof Consider such a v. Assume DOB(v) > n. Then, DOB(S, v, v′) > n. Thus,
by Proposition 45, either DOB(w) > n or DOB(w′) > n. However, this contradicts
DOB(S, w,w′) = n.
Proposition 47 For each n ∈ N, for each upward endless h1 ∈ HFn , there is no
h2 ∈ HF \ h1 such that, for each w1 ∈ h1, there is w2 ∈ h2 with w1Snw2.
Proof By induction on n ∈ N. If n = 0, easy since there is no upward endless
h1 ∈ HF0 . Consider n > 0 and assume thesis for every k < n. Suppose thesis fails
for n. Consider an upward endless h1 ∈ HFn such that there is h2 ∈ HF \ h1 such
that, for each w1 ∈ h1, there is w2 ∈ h2 with w1Snw2. If h1 ∈ HFn−1 , contradiction
by i.h. If h1 ∈ HFn \ HFn−1 , since h1 is upward endless, there is w1 ∈ h1 such
that {v1 ∈ h1|w1Rv1} has been introduced at step n answering (w1, ϕ) for some
formula ϕ of the form either fψ or gψ . Thus, since, for each v ∈ {v1 ∈ h1|w1Rv1},
Sn(v) = {v}, a contradiction follows.
Corollary 48 For every h1,∈ HF , there is no h2 ∈ HF \ {h1} such that for every
w1 ∈ h1 there is w2 ∈ h2, with w1Sw2. Therefore, h 	→ h, for h ∈ HF , is injective.
Proof Suppose not. Consider h1 ∈ HF and h2 ∈ HF \ {h1} such that for every
w1 ∈ h1 there is w2 ∈ h2, with w1Sw2. Consider w1 ∈ h1 and w2 ∈ h2 such
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that w1Sw2. Let DOB(S, w1, w2) = n. Consider any v1 ∈ h1 with w1Rv1. By
assumptions, there is v2 ∈ h2 such that w2Rv2 and v1Sv2. Thus, by Corollary 46,
DOB(v1),DOB(v2) and DOB(S, v1, v2) ≤ n. Thus, h1 ∈ HFn and for all w1 ∈ h1
there is w2 ∈ h2 such that w1Snw2. This contradicts Proposition 47.
Definition 49 Define B as the set of all h such that C  h is perfect.
Proposition 50 B is a bundle over (W,R).
Proof It follows from Proposition 38.5.
Definition 51 Given w ∈ W, h1, h2 ∈ Bw, define h1Iwh2 if and only if h1 ∩ w =
h2 ∩ w. Define I (w) = Iw.
Proposition 52 I is an indistinguishability function over (W,R, B).
Proof Easily I is a function and for each w ∈ W, Iw is an equivalence relation on
Bw. Given any v,w ∈ W, with vRw, and any h1, h2 ∈ Bw, with h1Iwh2, consider any
w′ ∈ h1 ∩ w, and any v′ ∈ h1 ∩ v. By linearity of h1, v′ and w′ must be comparable.
If w′ ≤ v′, possibly applying Proposition 38.4, we would contradict R ∩ S = ∅.
Hence v′ ∈ h2. In the same way, h2 ∩ v ⊆ h1 ∩ v. Therefore h1Ivh2.
Definition 53 For each w ∈ W , define πw = {h ∈ B|h ∩ w = {w}}.
Remark 54 Since R ∩ S = ∅, for every w ∈ W, for every h ∈ Bw, there is (one and
only one) w′ ∈ w such that h ∩ w = {w′}.
Proposition 55 For every w ∈ W, for every π ∈ w, there is a unique w′ ∈ w such
that π = πw′ .
Proof Consider any h ∈ π . Let h ∩ w = {w′}. Then, π = πw′ . Uniqueness easily
follows.
Definition 56 Given p ∈ PV , define
V ′(p) =
{
(w, πw′) ∈ P
(
⋃
w∈W
({w} × w)
)
|p ∈ C(w′)
}
.
Proposition 57 N = (W,R, B, I, V ′) is a model.
Proof It follows from the previous results.
Proposition 58 For each w ∈ W , πw is an equivalence class of Iw.
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Proof From Proposition 38.5, it follows that there is h ∈ Hw such that h ∈ Bw. By
Remark 54, h ∈ πw . Let π = {h′ ∈ B|hIwh′}. Plainly, πw = π .
Proposition 59 For every formula ϕ, for every w ∈ W , ϕ ∈ C(w) if and only if
N , (w, πw) |= ϕ.
Proof By induction on the complexity of ϕ. Easy, if ϕ is p, ¬ψ or ψ ∧ χ for some
atom p and formulas ψ and χ .
Suppose ϕ is Hψ and Hψ ∈ C(w). Take any h ∈ πw , any v ∈ h such that
v < w. Then, there is v′ ∈ v such that v′ ∈ h and v′Rw. Thus, ψ ∈ C(v′).
Hence, by inductive hypothesis, N , (v, πv′) |= ψ . Therefore, since πv′ = [h]Iv ,
N , (v, [h]Iv) |= ψ . In conclusion,N , (w, πw) |= Hψ . Suppose Hψ ∈ C(w). Then,
by Proposition 38.5, there is h ∈ Hw such that C  h is perfect. Hence, there is
v ∈ h such that vRw and ψ ∈ Cv. Thus, by inductive hypothesis, N , (v, πv) |= ψ .
Therefore, since πv = [h]Iv ,N , (v, [h]Iv) |= ψ . In conclusion,N , (w, πw) |= Hψ .
Suppose ϕ is Gψ and Gψ ∈ C(w). Take any h ∈ πw, any v ∈ h such that wRv.
Then, there is v′ ∈ v such that v′ ∈ h and wRv′. Thus, ψ ∈ C(v′). Hence, by
inductive hypothesis,N , (v, πv′) |= ψ . Therefore, since πv′ = [h]Iv ,N , (v, [h]Iv) |=
ψ . In conclusion, N , (w, πw) |= Gψ . Suppose Gψ ∈ C(w). Then, 38.6, there is
h ∈ Hw such that C  h is perfect and there is v ∈ h such that wRv and ψ ∈
C(v). Thus, by inductive hypothesis, N , (v, πv) |= ψ . Therefore, since πv = [h]Iv ,
N , (v, [h]Iv) |= ψ . In conclusion,N , (w, πw) |= Gψ .
Suppose ϕ is Fψ and Fψ ∈ C(w). Consider any h ∈ πw. By, definition, C  h
is perfect. Hence, there is v ∈ h such that ψ ∈ C(v). Thus, by inductive hypothesis,
N , (v, πv) |= ψ . Therefore, since πv = [h]Iv , N , (v, [h]Iv) |= ψ . In conclusion,
N , (w, πw) |= Fψ . Suppose Fψ ∈ C(w). Then, by Proposition 38.7, there is h ∈
Hw such that C  h is perfect and for all v ∈ h with wRv, ψ ∈ Cv. Hence, by
inductive hypothesis,N , (v, πv) |= ψ . Therefore, since πv = [h]Iv , N , (v, [h]Iv) |=
ψ . In conclusion,N , (w, πw) |= Fψ .
Suppose ϕ is Lψ and Lψ ∈ C(w). Take any π ∈ w. π = πw′ , for some w′ ∈ w.
Then, ψ ∈ C(w′). Thus, by inductive hypothesis, N , (w, πw′) |= ψ . Therefore,
N , (w, π) |= ψ . In conclusion, N , (w, πw) |= Lψ . Suppose Lψ ∈ C(w). Then,
by Proposition 38.8, there is w′ ∈ w such that ψ ∈ C(w′). Thus, by inductive
hypothesis,N , (w, πw′) |= ψ . Therefore,N , (w, πw) |= Lψ .
3.5 Soundness and Strong Completeness Theorem
At this point, for every IRR complete consistent theory we are able to exhibit
a model that satisfies it. Nonetheless, to prove the Soundness and Strong Com-
pleteness Theorem, we want to be able to do it for every consistent theory. The
problem is that not every consistent theory can be extended to an IRR com-
plete consistent theory. Therefore we cannot apply the construction introduced
above.
A consistent theory can be extended to a maximal consistent IRR theory only if
the number of atoms not occurring among the formulas in  is infinite. If we index
the set PV of atoms and we double (pi 	→ p2i ) the atoms pi ∈ , the resulting
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theory # is such that the number of atoms not occurring among the formulas in #
is infinite. It can be proved that, if  is consistent, then # is consistent as well.
Therefore, # can be extended to a maximal consistent IRR theory ∗. We are then
able to build a model for ∗. This model, by a slight modification of the evaluation
function, can be turned into a model for . The Sound and Strong Completeness
Theorem then follows.
Definition 60 Let p1, p2, ... be an enumeration without repetition of PV . Given
a formula ϕ, let #ϕ denote the formula obtained from ϕ by replacing every
occurrence of every atom pi with p2i . Given a theory , let # be the theory
obtained from  by replacing every ϕ ∈  with #ϕ. Given a theory , call
−1 the theory obtained from  as follows: first discard every ϕ ∈  wherein
some atom indexed with an odd number occurs; then replace every remaining #ϕ
with ϕ.
Proposition 61 Given a constant theory , if  is consistent, # is consistent.
Hence, by Proposition 16, there is an IRR complete consistent theory ∗, with
# ⊆ ∗.
Proof Suppose # is inconsistent. Therefore, there are #δ1, #δ2, ..., #δn ∈ # such
that  ¬∧ni=1 #δi . Consider any proof of ¬
∧n
i=1 #δi . Since such a proof is finite,
there is a one-one function s : PV → PV such that, for every atom p with
odd index occurring in the proof, s(p) has an even index and it does not occur in
the proof. Consider the sequence obtained from the considered proof of ¬∧ni=1 #δi
by replacing every atom p with odd index by s(q). Then, this sequence is of the
form #ϕ1, #ϕ2, ..., #ϕn. Moreover, #ϕ1, #ϕ2, ..., #ϕn is a proof of ¬∧ni=1 #δi as well.
Hence, ϕ1, ϕ2, ..., ϕn is a proof ¬∧ni=1 δi . Thus, since δ1, δ2, ..., δn ∈ ,  is
inconsistent.
Fix an arbitrary consistent theory  from Definition 62 to Proposition 64.
Definition 62 Let N = (W,R, B, I, V ′) be the model of Definition 39 for ∗. For
each p ∈ PV , define
V (p) =
{
(w, πw′) ∈ P
(
⋃
w∈W
({w} × w)
)
|p ∈ C−1(w′)
}
.
Define the model M = (W,R, B, I, V ) and call it model for .
Proposition 63 For every formula ϕ, w ∈ W, π ∈ w, M, (w, π) |= ϕ if and only
if N , (w, π) |= #ϕ.
Proof Easy induction on the complexity of ϕ.
Proposition 64 For every formula ϕ, for every w ∈ W , if ϕ ∈ C(w)−1 then
M, (w, πw) |= ϕ.
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Proof #ϕ ∈ C(w). Therefore, Propositions 63 and 59 impliesM, (w, πw) |= ϕ.
Proposition 65 For every consistent theory , there is a model T = (T ,<, B, I, V )
and a pair (t, π) ∈ ⋃t∈T ({t} × t) such that T , (t, π) |= .
Proof Consider the model M = (W,R, B, I, V ) for . According to the con-
struction, there is w ∈ W such that  ⊆ C−1(w). Therefore, Proposition 64 yields
M, (w, πw) |= .
Theorem 66 (Soundness and Strong Completeness Theorem) For every consistent
theory , every formula ϕ,   ϕ if and only if  |= ϕ.
Proof Left-to-right direction is easily provable. We use upward endlessness to prove
validity of axiom 1j (Gp → Fp), the indistinguishability condition to prove validity
of axioms 1g (Hp → HHp), 1h (Gp → GGp), 1l (Hp ∧ p ∧ Gp → GHp) and
1m (Hp ∧ p ∧ gp → gHp), both of them to prove validity of axiom 1n (FGp →
GFp), and irreflexivity to prove that the IRR rule preserves validity. For right-to-left
direction, suppose   ϕ. Then,  ∪ {¬ϕ} is consistent. Thus, there is a model T =
(T ,<, B, I, V ) and a pair (t, π) ∈ ⋃t∈T ({t}×t) such that T , (t, π) |= ∪ {¬ϕ}.
Therefore,  |= ϕ.
4 Further Research Topics
Along the paper two questions have been implicitly raised:
1. Is there an axiomatization of the considered logic without a form of the IRR rule?
As Section 3.2 and in particular Remark 15 show, the IRR rule is used to
get structural properties of the Kripke Frames of Section 3.3, namely Proposi-
tions 25 and 26. These properties seem unavoidable, as they guarantee that what
we obtain, by quotienting over S, in Section 3.4 is a tree. An axiomatization
without a form of the IRR rule seems then to need additional axioms to get these
properties. As the axiomatization of this paper is a mix of the axiomatizations
with IRR rule of the Peircean and bundled Ockhamist logics, would it be useful
to mix the axiomatizations without IRR rule for Peircean and bundled Ockhamist
logics of, respectively, [20] and [19]?
2. Is there an axiomatization of the logic of (unbundled) I -trees? First consider
the following example showing the crucial role of bundles in our construc-
tion. Let VBT denote the set of all validities of the class of all bundled I -trees.
Consider the formula γ = LG(Lp → MfLp) → Mg(Lp → fLp).
With a bit of work, one can show that γ ∈ VBT . Consider a formula equiv-
alent to ¬γ such as LG(Lp → MfLp) ∧ LF(Lp ∧ GM¬p). Since we
proved that the Hilbert system of Section 2.3 is sound and strongly complete
with respect to VBT , we know that such a formula is consistent, whence that
there is an IRR complete consistent theory  containing LG(Lp → MfLp)∧
LF(Lp ∧ GM¬p).
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Then, the construction of Section 3.3 produces the following situation, where
straight lines denote R and waved lines S:
with C(w) = . When quotienting over S, we obtain a new history, say h∞
(straight lines denoting R):
Without a bundle we would have to consider h∞ as well. Surely, for all
v and h ∈ Hv, if Lp ∈ v, then we would define (v, [h]v) ∈ V (p). Then,
N , (w, [h∞]) |= g(Lp → fLp).
ThenN , (w, πw) |= Mg(Lp → fLp). However, since LF(Lp∧GM¬p) ∈
C(w), we would contradict Proposition 59.
Now, let VT be the set of all validities of the class of all (unbundled) I -trees.
With a bit of work one can show that γ ∈ VT . Moreover, since an (unbundled)
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I -tree can be seen as a bundled I -tree where the bundle select all the histories,
VBT ⊆ VT . Therefore, VBT  VT . This suggests the need of new axioms and
rules to get the ‘missing validities’ (e.g. γ ). But what are these new axioms and
rules? In [14, 15], formulas similar to γ have been used to highlight similar issues
concerning the axiomatization of the Ockhamist logic of unbundled trees. In
[15], adding an axiom schema to obtain certain validities on the flavor of γ yields
an axiomatization of the Ockhamist logic of unbundled trees. This suggests to
try adding a similar axiom schema.
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